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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in

refusing to modify the child custody provision at issue based
upon the Court's finding that Plaintiff-Appellant ("Mr.

Walton")

had not established a substantial change of circumstance?
On appeal, Mr. Walton bears the burden to prove that
the Trial Court abused its broad discretion in denying his
petition to modify the custody award to Defendant-Appellee

("Ms.

Walton") or that the Court' s refusal to modify is manifestly
unjust.

See, e. g. , Maughan v. Maucrhan, 770 P. 2d 156, 159 (Utah

Ct. App. 1989) and Fullmer v. Fullmer. 761 P. 2d 942, 945 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
2.

Does the record on appeal compel this Court to

find that the best interests of the Walton children would be
served by granting Mr. Walton' s petition to modify custody or to
remand the matter to the Trial Court for further consideration?
The standard of judicial review with regard to this
issue is the same as issue 1 above.

-2g'\wpl\194\00000$p3 W51

3.

Did the Trial Court err in finding that Mr. Walton

failed to establish a substantial change of circumstance
justifying a modification of custody?
Appellate courts will not set aside a trial court' s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and the
challenging party has marshaled the evidence.

See, e, a. ,

Mauahan, 776 P. 2d at 922; and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
52(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules, or regulations which are determinative to any
issue in this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Except as described below, Ms. Walton does not dispute
the statement of facts in Mr. Walton' s brief.

However, Mr.

Walton' s statement of facts must be supplemented as set forth
below to accurately reflect the record on appeal.
1.

The testimony and report of Ms. Linda Hunt, who

performed a custody evaluation in this matter, clearly
establishes that Ms. Walton does "a very good job in her
parenting skills" and Ms. Hunt' s recommendation that custody be
modified in Mr. Walton's favor was "very difficult" and a "close
-3g:\wpl\194\00000sp3.W51

call.11

(Transcript of Proceedings, pp. 62-3).

Ms. Hunt further

testified that Ms. Walton spends quality time with and expresses
considerable care and love for her children, and that Ms. Hunt is
"very much impressed with the parenting skills, personal growth
and accomplishment of [Ms. ] Walton. "

(Tr. pp. 63-5; Custody

Evaluation Report, pp. 9, 12).
2.

The Walton children are thriving emotionally and

doing well in school under Ms. Walton' s custody, and there is no
evidence whatsoever that the present custodial arrangement is
harmful or destructive to the children' s emotional and physical
growth, development, or well being.
3.

(Tr. pp. 67-8, 112).

Ms. Hunt testified she found no evidence that Ms.

Walton has drinking, smoking, or morality problems, and Ms.
Walton is continuing the childrens' religious upbringing.
pp.

64, 70).

(Tr.

Ms. Hunt further testified that Ms. Walton was

mentally and physically able to meet the needs of the children,
and that the children were very well adjusted.
4.

(Tr. pp. 71-2).

With regard to Mr. Walton' s assertion that the

children have been exposed to acts of violence under their
present living arrangements and are frightened, the record
contains no testimony to that effect except for the fact that a
little boy living in the same apartment complex once "bullied"
-4g \wpl\194\00000sp3 W51

the Walton children, but that situation has been resolved, and no
physical harm Lo che Walton children has occurred.

i n . pp. 102-
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1

.: 5 , Courts are given broad discretion in
. . ig on custody modifi cati ons and Mr.
wa.1311 has failed to es tablish that the
Court's application of the change of
. •""• imstance rule was an abuse of discretion,
Mauahan and Fullmer cle arly demonstrate that
Mr. Walton' s challenge in this regard is
without merit.
Additio nally, Mr. Walton did
not raise this argument before the Trial
Court and he should be precluded from raising
:! t f o r 1: h e f i r s t 11 m en oappeal.

ISSUE 2:

7he Lecord. on appeal does not compe 1 a ri i 1 i ng
*:hat the best interests of the Walton
children would be served by a modification in
custody under the appropriate legal standard.

ISSUE 3.
nis challenge
:
fa'- :
. nainas

uid

-5g: \wpl\194\OOOOOsp3.W51

L ., -dib 1 ia1 11 ie evi dence
the Trial Court' s
.. d r.zz be considered.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

1.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO MODIFY THE PRESENT CUSTODIAL
ARRANGEMENT BASED ON ITS FINDING THAT MR.
WALTON FAILED TO PROVE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
OF CIRCUMSTANCE.

Mr. Walton Failed to Raise Before the Trial Court

the Argument He Raises Here.
Mr. Walton' s primary argument on appeal is that the
Trial Court abused its discretion in requiring him to prove a
substantial change of circumstance as a prerequisite to modifying
the present custody arrangement.

Mr. Walton asserts that because

the custody arrangement in this case was based on a stipulation
the Trial Court must necessarily employ a "flexible" approach to
the change of circumstance requirement, and receive evidence1 of
and make findings with regard to the best interests of the
children.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 10-11).

However, the record on

appeal contains no hint that Mr. Walton urged the Trial Court to
apply such a flexible approach.

Mr. Walton' s post-hearing

memorandum to the Trial Court on the issue of child custody did
not raise this argument nor did it cite or discuss the cases Mr.
!

The Trial Court did in fact receive evidence regarding the
best interests of the children over the objection of Ms. Walton's
counsel that a change of circumstance had not yet been
established.
The Trial Court received all of the evidence Mr.
Walton offered, and no error can be assigned in this regard.
-6g:\wpl\194\00000sp3.W51
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.ai lge in

2.

The Change of Circumstance Rule.

It is well established that a party seeking to modify a
divorce decree, including a child custody award, must first
establish that a change of circumstance has occurred subsequent
to the entry of the decree which merits reopening previously
resolved issues.
(Utah 1987).

See, e. a. , Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P. 2d 624, 626

The change of circumstance threshold is intended to

discourage frequent petitions for modification of custody by the
noncustodial parent where a change is not clearly justified, to
protect the custodial parent from harassing and repeated
litigation, and to protect the child from unstabilizing "pingpong" custody arrangements.

The rule essentially creates a

rebuttable presumption in favor of maintaining custody
arrangements in order to enhance the stability of a child.

See,

e. a. , Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P. 2d 599, 606 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
However, Utah Courts began to identify problems with
and became critical of the strict application of the rule under
all circumstances.

Courts reasoned that since the ultimate

objective of a child custody award is to enhance the best
interests of the child, the change of circumstance rule should
not preclude a modification where the child is in a marginal or
-8g \wpl\194\00000sp3 W51
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alleged changed circumstances of one or the
other of the parents may result in great harm
to a child. That does not mean that a change
of custody should be made when it is shown
that one parent is marginally better than
another, but it does mean that a trial nudge
should not focus exclusively on factors apart
from the best interests of the children and
ignore all evidence pertaining to the
children7 s welfare in a hearing on changed
circumstances.
Kramer, 738 P. 2d at 628-29 (Stewart, J. , concurring) (emphasis
added).
Justice Howe, concurring with the Kramer majority, also
wrote that in his view the change of circumstance rule should not
be as rigidly applied if, for example, the initial custody decree
was based on the fact that both parents were only marginally fit
or where the initial award was based on an unlitigated decree.
However, Justice Howe affirmed that the underlying justification
for the flexible approach is to insure that a child will "not be
subjected to spending the rest of his or her minority in an
inferior environment because of the inaction of one parent at the
time custody is awarded. "

I&.

at 629 (Howe, J. , concurring)

(emphasis added).
Thus, from the inception of the flexible approach it
has always b€*en clear that the factor triggering its application
is the inferior or destructive nature of the present custodial
•10g:\wpl\194\00000sp3.W51

arrangement, not merely that the decree was unadjudicated, as Mr.
Walton asserts.

The flexible approach simply relaxes the

evidentiary and procedural restrictions placed on a trial court
by the change of circumstance rule, allowing the court to
determine if in fact the present custody arrangement is inimical
to the child.
Cases subsequent to Kramer have clearly articulated
that the strict change of circumstance threshold gives way to the
flexible approach only if it appears the present custodial
relationship is marginal or destructive to the child.

Mr. Walton

cites no authority holding that the flexible approach must be
applied in all cases simply because the prior award was
unadjudicated, and he cites no case where a trial court's refusal
to modify an award has been overturned for failure to apply the
flexible approach.

In fact, the reported cases reach the

opposite result.
In Maughan v. Mauahan, 770 P. 2d 156, 160 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), the noncustodial father petitioned for modification of a
stipulated custody arrangement.

The trial court, rigidly

applying the change of circumstance rule, denied the petition
based upon the father' s failure to prove a substantial change in
the custodial parent' s parenting ability or in the custodial
-11g:\wpl\194\OOOOOsp3.W51

arrangement, and the father appealed.

I_d. at 158-9.

The Court

of Appeals acknowledged that under Hoaae v. Hoaae, 649 P. 2d 51
(Utah 1982), Kramer, and Fullmer, a trial court has great
latitude in applying the change of circumstance rule and may
inquire into the best interests of the children where the decree
is stipulated.

id. at 160.

Under such facts, "the trial court,

at its discretion, fis 1 permitted to inquire into ' the effects on
the child of the established custodial relationship as it has
developed over time. ' "

Id. at 160 (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court' s denial
of the father's petition for modification "even under this less
rigid legal standard" because the denial was not "so flagrantly
unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion. "

Ijd.

The facts

of the present case, both procedurally and substantively, are
almost identical to Mauahan and also compel an affirmative.
In Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P. 2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), the Court of Appeals held that even if the initial custody
award is stipulated, a strict application of the change of
circumstances rule is appropriate where the present custodial
arrangement is not marginal or destructive, and that a trial
court does abuse its discretion in not strictly applying the
change in circumstance rule in such a situation.
-12g:\wpl\194\00000sp3.W51

Cf. Elmer v.

Elmer, 776 P. 2d 599, 504 (Utah 1989) (the principle of stability
should not be allowed to protect a parent who is indifferent to
or destructive of the child's welfare).
As discussed below, the evidence clearly establishes
that Ms. Walton is a very good parent and that the children are
thriving under her care in every sense.

Thus, Mr. Walton has

failed to demonstrate that the Trial Court erred in applying the
change of circumstance requirement, and "where the children
appear to be comparatively well adjusted and happy, they should
not be compelled to change their home unless there appears some
substantial reason for doing so. "

Hoaae v. Hoaae. 649 P. 2d 51,

55 (Utah 1982) (quoting Trego v. Trego, 565 P. 2d at 75).

This

Court should affirm.
POINT II:

Mr.

THE RECORD ON APPEAL DOES NOT AND WILL NOT
SUPPORT A FINDING THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN FOR THE
PRESENT CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT TO BE MODIFIED.

Walton urges this Court to either remand this

matter to the Trial Court with instructions to expressly consider
and enter findings regarding the best interests of the children
or for this Court to reverse the Trial Court and enter its own
findings supporting the modification Mr. Walton seeks.
Walton is not entitled to either form of relief.

-13g.\wpl\194\00000sp3.W51

Mr.

First, even if the Court holds that the Trial Court
abused its discretion in its application of the change of
circumstances rule, this error is harmless.

The facts in the

record, as discussed below, are clear, uncontroverted, and are
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of maintaining the
existing custody arrangement, whether this result is based on Mr.
Walton' s failure to prove a change of circumstance, as the Trial
Court held, or the failure of the evidence to overcome the
presumption that a modification in custody is not in the best
interests of the children.
917,

See, e. g. , Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P. 2d

924 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (failure of trial court to enter

findings on material issue will not require remand if the record
is clear, uncontroverted, and only capable of supporting an
affirmance).
A close examination of the record evidence upon which
Mr.

Walton relies in claiming that the best interests of the

children would be "greatly benefitted" by changing their custody
to him demonstrates the tenuous if not frivolous nature of his
position.

These factors can be summarized generally as follows:

(1) Mr. Walton's financial condition is better than Ms. Walton's
condition; (2) Ms. Walton cannot provide a male role model for
the children; (3) Ms. Walton desires custody only so she can
-14g: \wpl\194\00000sp3.W51

receive child support; (4) Ms. Walton is going to school full
time and places the children in day care; and (5) the housing
arrangements Mr. Walton could provide are more desirable than
those provided by Ms. Walton.

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-16).

This evidence does not provide a legal basis for modifying an
existing custody arrangement under any standard.

In fact, the

Trial Court would abuse its discretion if it did grant Mr.
Walton' s petition based on this evidence.
In Fullmer, 761 P. 2d 942, involving circumstances
remarkably similar to the present case, the trial court granted
the father' s petition to modify a stipulated custody award to the
mother based on the court' s finding that a change in circumstance
had been proved.

The father sought the modification because

after the divorce the mother had to work full time and place the
child in day care.

On the other hand, the father had remarried

and established a stable home while the mother moved
occasionally.

The custody evaluator testified that the child was

well adjusted and that both parties were good parents.

The

evaluator also characterized his recommendation to change custody
from the mother to the father as M a close call" based upon the
father' s solid employment and more stable home environment.
at 944-45.

I_d.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court' s order
-15-
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of modification, holding that the court abused its discretion in
failing to strictly adhere to the change of circumstance rule,
and also
by relying on [the child's] placement in
full-time day care to change his custody
placement.
[The mother] had no choice but to
work full-time in order to adequately support
[the child] and herself. In this era, more
and more children are raised by single
parents who must work. . . . Day care is a
reality and we find no basis in the facts of
this case or any scholarly authority cited to
support the trial court' s conclusion that day
cai:e is per se less advantageous than a step
mother custodian.
Id. at 948.

The Court of Appeals stated that the "flexible"

approach suggested by Justice Stewart and Justice Howe in Kramer
was not appropriate in Fullmer because adherence to the strict
change of circumstance rule would not leave the child in a
"marginal situation."

Id. at 94 7.

Similarly, the Trial Court' s denial of Mr. Walton' s
petition will not leave the Walton children in a marginal
situation.

If the Trial Court in this matter would have modified

the child custody arrangement based upon the evidence adduced by
Mr.

Walton, Fullmer would compel a reversal by this Court.
Mr.

Walton' s assertion that he is financially more able

to provide for the children' s needs is also insufficient to
justify a change in custody.

Mr. Walton has previously sought to
-16-
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modify his alimony and child support obligations as well as the
$2,500 annual marital property settlement he must pay Ms. Walton.
The Trial Court did in fact reduce Mr. Walton' s alimony and child
support obligations, but refused to modify the property
settlement.

Nonetheless, Mr. Walton has failed and refused to

pay the $2,500 annual marital settlement installments, which have
now accrued in the sum of $10, 000.

Apparently, Mr. Walton' s

financial condition is subject to change as it best suits him.
Mr. Walton is financially unable to meet his obligations to Ms.
Walton when those obligations are due, but Mr. Walton is
financially able to provide a better environment than Ms. Walton
for their children when custody is at issue.

As Judge Billings

noted in Fullmer, "it is anomalous for a divorced noncustodial
parent to complain about a high child support and alimony award,
succeed in lowering the amount, and then argue that because the
custodial parent must work to support the child and him or
herself there is grounds for a change in custody."
P. 2d at 948, n. 3.

Fullmer, 761

Similarly, if Mr. Walton would simply comply

with his financial obligations to Ms. Walton under the Divorce
Decree, she too would perhaps be able to purchase a home in a
nice rural area and provide the children with allowances, Nikes
and Nintendo.

Utah law should not and does not allow the system
-17-
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to be manipulated by a noncustodial parent as Mr. Walton attempts
to do here, and this Court should disregard the financial status
of the parties on this basis alone.
The fact that Ms. Walton spends time outside the home
attending school in order to improve her circumstances and those
of her children is also insufficient to justify modification of
custody.

In Maughan, this Court cited with approval the

following reasoning by the trial court in denying the father' s
petition to modify custody:
A single parent who has to take what
employment they can get certainly has more
difficulty as opposed to dual parents. The
single has to arrange schedules, child care,
perform all the household tasks, that are
necessary. The court does not feel that the
[custodial parent] should be penalized
because of this kind of a situation where she
does not have the same financial abilities as
the [noncustodial parent] in order to provide
a stable environment. The fact that the
[noncustodial parent] remarried making this a
dual parent household is not such a
substantial change of circumstances that
would merit a change of custody or simply any
remarriage would have the ping-pong effect on
child custody.
770 P. 2d at 161.

It would be manifestly unjust to penalize Ms.

Walton by taking custody of her children away from her on the
grounds that her attendance at school, an effort to make their
lives better, is not in her childrens' best interest.
-18g \wpl\194\00000sp3 W51

Ms. Walton

and other custodial parents should be supported and encouraged to
better themselves in this fashion, not penalized and discouraged.
Finally, Mr. Walton' s contention that he should be
granted custody so he can provide a proper male role model for
the boys is also insufficient.

Apparently, Mr. Walton suggests

that at some point during a male child' s life a father should be
favored over a mother due to his gender.
legal support for such a position.

There is absolutely no

Further, Mr. Walton' s

assertions that Ms. Walton wishes to maintain custody of her
children only because of the child support she gets is entirely
unsupported by the record and irrelevant.

Ms. Hunt, the custody

evaluator, testified that in her view Ms. Walton was a very
loving and caring parent.

As Ms. Walton testified at the

hearing, while it is understandably important that she maintain
her current level of income, including child support and alimony,
she is not putting that above raising her children.

(Tr. p. 98).

Thus, there is simply no evidence in the record which
would support any finding other than that Mr. Walton has failed
to demonstrate any legal basis for modifying the present custody
arrangement.
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POINT III:

MR. WALTON HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
AND THEREFORE HIS CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL
COURT' S FINDINGS ARE WITHOUT MERIT.

A party who wishes to challenge a trial court' s
findings of fact on appeal must marshal the evidence.

See, e.g.,

Scharf v. BMG Corn. , 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

Mr. Walton

attempts to avoid this obligation by asserting "a review of the
record fails to disclose facts which the Court could rely upon to
articulate justification for a finding that there was no change
in circumstance."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 15).

To the contrary,

the record bears ample evidence to support the Trial Court' s
finding and this Court should refuse to consider Mr. Walton' s
challenge to any of the findings for failing to marshal that
evidence.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Walton asserts that this
appeal is frivolous under the clear mandates set forth by this
Court in Maughan and Fullmer.

Accordingly, as a result of having

to defend this appeal Ms. Walton requests an award of reasonable
attorney fees against Mr. Walton pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Alternatively, Ms. Walton requests

an award of fees under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989).

The

financial need of Ms. Walton and disparity in the parties'
-20g:\wpl\194\00000sp3.W51

financial resources is most aptly demonstrated by Mr. Walton' s
own argument that this Court should modify custody based on his
superior financial resources.

See Mauahan, 770 P. 2d at 162-3.

CONCLUSION
Mr.

Walton has failed to prove that the Trial Court

abused its discretion in applying the change of circumstance rule
in denying his petition to modify custody.

Mauahan and Fullmer

clearly demonstrate that the Trial Court did not abuse its
discretion.

Further, Mr. Walton7 s argument miscontrues Utah law

and was not raised below.

Finally, even if this Court concludes

that the Trial Court erred in its application of the change of
circumstance requirement, that error is harmless because the
evidence does not establish that the best interests of the
children would be served by a change in custody.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this p 7 ^ \ day of February,
1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

endant-Appellee
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